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THE SALES CONTRACT-FORMATION*
RICHARD D. CUDAHY**
INTRODUCTION
Introduction to the Sales Transaction
A "sale" consists in the transfer of the general property interest in
goods from the "seller" to the "buyer" for a consideration called the
"price." A "contract for sale" (or sales agreement) includes both a
present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time. A
"present sale" means a sale which is accomplished by the making of
the contract. The concept of "sale" necessarily implies contractual ar-
rangements and excludes gratuitous transfers.1
The former Wisconsin law of sales was incorporated in Wis. Stat.
§§121.01 to 121.79, enacting the Uniform Sales Act,2 which remained
substantially unchanged until enactment of Article 2 (the "Sales Ar-
ticle," chapter 402 of the Wisconsin Statutes) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. The Uniform Sales Act was essentially a codification of
the common law as of the date of its promulgation.'
The Uniform Sales Act provided few rules governing the formation
of sales contracts, leaving this matter primarily to the common law. The
Code, on the other hand, contains a number of special contract forma-
tion provisions which depart from common-law principles. These special
rules are specifically designed to meet mercantile problems and apply
only to sales of goods; they do not displace common-law rules in such
matters as contracts for personal services or for the sale of real prop-
erty. Further, and very important, where the Code provides no special
rule, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and
the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel,
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or
other validating or invalidating cause supplement the Code.4 It should
also be noted that under the Code legal consequences are stated as fol-
lowing directly from the contract and action taken under it; considera-
tions of when property or title passed or was to pass are not decisive.5
Contracts may alternatively be regarded as "negotiated" (contracted
between parties on a face-to-face basis) or "form" (created by execut-
*This article is substantially the same as that contained in a chapter of the
same title and by the same author appearing in the Wisconsin Uniform Cont-
inercial Code Handbook, a joint activity of the state bar of Wisconsin, Mar-
quette University, and the University of Wisconsin.
**President, Patrick Cudahy, Inc., Cudahy, Wisconsin; Lecturer, Marquette
University Law School, Wisconsin. Mr. James Dwyer, Marquette University
Law School class of 1965, has assisted in the preparation of this article
through research and otherwise.
I WIS. STAT. §402.106(1).
21911.
31906.
4 WIS. STAT. §401.103.
5 Wis. STAT. §402A01.
SALL5 CONTRACT
ing a form or forms prepared by the buyer, or seller, or both) or
"oral" (frequently made by telephone and sometimes confirmed by let-
ters employing standard jargon). Some of the special contract forma-
tion rules contained in the Code are more clearly applicable to one of
these basic types of contracts than to the others.
Practice Tips Sumnmarized
In most respects contract formation problems will be governed by
the same principles under the Code as under pre-Code law, for common-
law contract rules continue in force unless displaced by the Code. In
several respects, however, the Code makes important changes, which
are discussed at appropriate places throughout this article. Some of the
more important points which the parties and their attorneys must keep
in mind are the following:
(1.) "Merchants" who make "firm offers" will, within statutory
limitations, be bound by them, notwithstanding a lack of con-
sideration to support them. It therefore becomes important to
express precisely the offeror's intent, particularly as to the
expiration date of the offer.
(2.) The common-law rules of offer and counter offer in form con-
tracts have been drastically changed by section 402.207, but
the impact of this section may be modified by appropriate pro-
visions in the purchase order and acknowledgement forms.
(3.) A seller no longer may rely upon the conclusion of simple
contract law that a shipment of nonconforming goods is not
an acceptance and therefore cannot constitute a breach. If
the seller who ships nonconforming goods wishes to avoid
being held liable for a breach, he must seasonably notify the
buyer that the goods are shipped only as an accommodation.
(4.) In the case of an ambiguous offer where the beginning of
performance may be a reasonable mode of acceptance, the
offeree should notify the offeror that he has accepted the offer
and not rely solely on the beginning of performance as an
acceptance.
(5.) Important changes have been made in the Statute of Frauds
governing the sale of goods. In particular, buyers and sellers
should be aware of section 402.201(2) requiring written no-
tice of objection to a letter of confirmation of an oral contract
to be given within 10 days after receipt of the letter in order
to retain the protection of the Statute.
PROBLEMS OF CERTAINTY AND MUTUALITY
Seals or Witnesses not Required
Under the Code the use of seals or witnesses in connection with a
sales contract is unnecessary and does not enhance the rights of the
parties, either with respect to the requirement for consideration or with
1965]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
respect to the tolling of the statute of limitations in an action brought
on the document. 6
Section 328.27 of the Wisconsin Statutes, to the effect that a seal
shall be presumptive evidence of a sufficient consideration, is thus, in
the case of sales contracts, nullified by the Code. Further, section
330.16(2) and section 330.18(2) pertaining to extending statutes of
limitation for sealed documents no longer apply to contracts for the
sale of goods.
The Code does not, however, change the statutory or other signifi-
cance of a seal in authenticating corporate or official documents or in
other matters related merely to signatures or to authentication of ex-
ecution and the like.'
The Effect of Indefiniteness
Under simple contract law agreements were sometimes held to be
unenforceable because they were so vague and indefinite as not to fully
reveal the intention of the parties. The Code s meets the problem of
indefiniteness by providing that "[e]ven though one or more terms are
left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the
parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably cer-
tain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."9
Consideration; The Firm Offer
In general, the Code does not change the common-law requirement
of consideration. An exception to this general principle is discussed
below in connection with the "firm offer." Another exception is found
in section 402.209(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes relating to agreements
to modify sales contracts.
Under simple contract law an offer supported by a promise not to
revoke it (a "firm" offer) which was made without consideration was
not enforceable and could be revoked at will. This inability to make
a firm offer unsupported by consideration has been the subject of
much controversy and criticism over the years. It would seem that the
unenforceability of such firm offers violated one of the fundamental
objectives of contract law, namely, the realization of reasonable ex-
pectations induced by promises. From time to time the doctrine of
promissory estoppel has been invoked to achieve this objective in the
face of the consideration difficulty.
The Code meets the problem neatly by providing that:
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing
which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not
revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time stated or if
6 WIS. STAT. §402.203.
7 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-203, comment 2.8 Wis. STAT. §402.204(3).
9 For specific applications of the philosophy of this section, see Wis. STAT.§§402.205 (open price term), 402.306 (output requirements and exclusive
dealings) and 402.311 (options and cooperation respecting performance).
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no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may such
period of irrevocability exceed 3 months unless consideration is
given; but any such term of assurance on a form supplied by
the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror."' 10
There are several aspects of this provision which combine to allow
firm offers to be flexibly employed while, at the same time, providing
safeguards against over-reaching and surprise in their use, as follows:
(1.) The term "signed" comprehends "any symbol executed or
adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a
writing."':
(2.) The section is, of course, limited to offers pertaining to the
sale of "goods" as defined in the Code.' 2
(3.) The section has application only to firm offers made by "mer-
chants," a term defined in the Code 13 and meaning in general
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction
or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his
employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who
by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge
or skill.
(4.) The section does not apply to long-term options; and options
for a period longer than three months intended to be enforced
under this section will be enforced to the extent of three
months only.
(5.) The Code does not state how the period of irrevocability is to
be computed. Therefore, to achieve precision in the firm offer,
it should state the precise time of its expiration (e.g., "This
offer will remain effective until 11:00 A.M., C.S.T., November
1, 1964, and will then expire.") rather than stating that the offer
will expire after 30 days or three months or some similar pe-
riod. If the period of irrevocability must remain indefinite be-
cause it is made dependent on a contingency which may or
may not occur within a three-month period (such, for example,
as the availability of certain materials), the firmness should be
guaranteed until the happening of the contingency. If the con-
tingency does not occur within the three-month period, the
offer lapses at the expiration of the period.
(6.) The section affords protection against the inadvertent signing
of a firm offer prepared by the offeree by requiring that such
10 Wis. STAT. §402.205.
II Wis. STAT. §402.201(39).
12 WIS. STAT. §402.105.
13 WIS. STAT. §402.104.
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a term must be separately authenticated by the offeror. Initial-
ing such a clause would seem sufficient authenticationi
PROBLEMS OF OFFER ANp ACCEPTANCE
The Circumstances of Offer and Acceptance
The Code provides that, "A contract for sale of goods may be made
in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both
parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract."'14 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Sales contracts are frequently formed by the buyer's executing and
sending of a purchase order (offer) to the seller which the seller ac-
cepts by executing it and sending his acknowledgement form to the
buyer. The purchase order form usually originates with the buyer, but
a seller with strong bargaining power may require use of his own forms
by the buyer. In such a case, there usually is no problem of conflicting
terms in the purchase order and acknowledgement, such as are dis-
cussed in this article. There may, however, be a question as to when
exactly the contract is formed. The terms of the purchase order itself
may provide some guidance, or usage. of the trade or course of dealing
between the buyer and seller may determine whether the buyer's sign-
ing of a purchase order operates (1) to create an offer which is sub-
sequently accepted by the seller at its home office or elsewhere or (2)
to create an acceptance by the buyer of an offer deemed to be made by
the seller in supplying the form.
15
Similarly, there may be an analogous problem in situations where an
acknowledgement form (a form which ordinarily emanates from the
seller) is supplied by the buyer to the seller. The execution of such an
acknowledgement by the seller may be treated either as an offer by the
seller requiring subsequent acceptance by the buyer or as an acceptance
of the buyer's offer as represented by the acknowledgement. Usually,
however, an acknowledgment prepared by the buyer takes the form of
an acknowledgement copy of the purchase order, which the seller is
directed to sign if it wishes to make the sale. In this event the pur-
chase order, the contract, both under simple contract law and under the
acceptance.'
No specific provision of the Code deals with the question whether
a "quotation" constitutes an offer; therefore, simple contract law ap-
plies. It is a question of fact whether a catalog description or other
quotation amounts to an offer by the seller which may be accepted by
the buyer's submission of a "clean" purchase order in response thereto.
A "clean" purchase order is, of course, one which contains no terms
or conditions of its own but has the effect of accepting seller's offer on
14 Ws. STAT. §402204(1).
is Ibid.
16 See 1 HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UCC 12.
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its own terms. On the other hand, the circumstances may be such that
the purchase order is construed to be an offer incorporating expressly
or impliedly the catalog description or other quotation, in which case
the contract is made when the seller replies with its order acknowledg-
ment form.
If a quotation by the seller does not amount to an offer or a counter-
offer and buyer's subsequent purchase order is therefore properly
deemed to be the offer, contract formation depends upon the further
acts of the seller. Thus, if the seller merely signs a copy of the pur-
chase order, the contract, both under simple contrac tlaw and under the
provisions of the Code, is formed on the buyer's terms and conditions.
Some difficulty may be encountered if the seller responds with his own
clean acknowledgment even though the buyer's purchase order contains
an acknowledgment clause indicating that no contract shall be formed
except by signing the acknowledgment copy of the purchase order.
Theoretically, in such a case, the seller's acknowledgment form con-
stitutes a counteroffer which in many cases is deemed to be accepted by
the buyer's conduct. Presumably, under the Code,1' the contract is
formed if the buyer fails to object to the seller's use of its own clean
acknowledgment form.
The Battle of the Forms
Under the common law serious problems were presented in the
situation where a purchasing order intended as an offer was responded
to by an acknowledgment form containing different or additional terms.
In this case, prior to the Code, such an exchange of non-matching docu-
ments (constituting an "offer" and a "counteroffer") resulted in no
contract even though businessmen almost universally believed that un-
der these circumstances they had made a deal. In legal contemplation,
however, no contract was formed until the seller shipped the goods and
the buyer accepted them, the theory being that buyer's conduct (by way
of acceptance of the goods) amounted to acceptance of the seller's
counteroffer (on seller's terms). These applications of traditional con-
tract principles have been radically modified by section 402.207, the
thrust of which is to sustain the contract if a contract was intended
and to provide a means for determining the terms of the contract from
among the provisions of the forms exchanged by the parties.
Section 402.207(1) provides in effect that where the order ac-
knowledgment form contains additional or different terms from those
found in the purchase order, such terms do not necessarily prevent a
contract from coming into being. A contract is created if (1) there is a
"definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written con-
firmation" and (2) the "acceptance is [not] expressly made conditional
an assent to the additional or different terms." Under this provision,
17 WIs. STAT. §402.204(1).
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the language of the acknowledgment form characterizing or otherwise
making reference to its own terms and conditions may be critical.
Section 402.207(1) is intended to end the "ribbon matching" ap-
proach of the common law under which no contract is formed unless
the acceptance exactly matches the offer. Section 402.207(2), on the
other hand, governs the disposition to be made of additional or dif-
ferent terms of the acceptance since, "[b] etween merchants such terms
become part of the contract unless: (a) The offer expressly limits ac-
ceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) They materially alter it; or (c)
Notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received." The question
whether under (b) there has been a material alteration is a question of
fact to be determined under all the circumstances.
In any event, section 402.207 (1) must be relied upon to determine
whether there has been a definite and seasonable expression of ac-
ceptance or a written confirmation such as to create a binding contract
in spite of the inclusion in the "acceptance" or confirmation of addi-
tional or different terms; but section 402.207(2) must be relied upon
to ascertain which, if any, of the additional or different terms become
part of the contract. In some cases "different" terms should be deemed
excluded because under section 402.207 (2) (c) "notification of objection
to them has already been given" by reason of the terms of the offer.
NOTE: Section 402.207(2) refers to the possible incorporation
into the contract of "additional or different" terms and thereby
deviates from the official text of the Code which refers only to
"additional" terms.
Subsection (3) of section 402.207 abrogates the so-called "last shot"
principle of negotiations at common law. Under this principle, the
seller's acknowledgment (the "last shot" in the formal negotiations)
may be deemed to be accepted, and its terms thereby binding. If the
buyer accepts goods sent to him by the seller pursuant to such ac-
knowledgment. Section 402.207(3) reverses this result by making clear
that subsequent conduct of the parties in pursuance of the contract does
not necessarily result in adoption of the last proposal of the formal
negotiations. Under this subsection the terms of a contract for sale
based upon conduct of the parties "consist of those terms on which the
writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms
incorporated under any other provisions of this code." Thus a term of
the acknowledgement which materially alters the contract as proposed
in the offer,18 does not necessarily become part of the contract arising
from acceptance of the goods after shipment by the seller. Such a ma-
terial alteration ought to be binding on the buyer only if the buyer ex-
is -Wis. STAT. §402.207 (2) (b).
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pressly assents to it or if it arises by operation of law under any other
provisions of the Code including those of section 402.207.
EXAMPLE. Suppose there is a disagreement as to warranties
between buyer's purchase order and seller's acknowledgment.
Under the "last shot" principle, a seller's disclaimer of warran-
ties might become effective by reason of the buyer's acceptance
of the good shipped. Under the Code, however, unless the buyer's
terms as to warranties accord with the seller's, a unilateral dis-
claimer by the seller should not be deemed effective, and implied
warranties recognized by Roto-Litth, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett,39 con-
struing the Massachusetts counterpart of section 402.207, reaches
the opposite conclusion but is generally considered to have been
wrongly decided. 0
Presumably, both parties can expressly limit the operation of section
402.207 in some of its aspects:
(1.) A buyer's purchase order containing a provision that "accept-
ance is strictly limited to these terms" can prevent seller's
"non-material" additional or different terms from becoming
binding "modifications" through silence or inaction.2 1
(2.) The seller may prevent a contract from coming into being on
the buyer's terms by providing that the acknowledgment is an
acceptance if, but only if, the buyer is willing to assent to the
additional terms contained therein.2 2 In the latter case, how-
ever, the seller should not ship the goods relying upon the "last
shot" principle to carry into effect the terms of the acknowledg-
ment since the "last shot" rule is nullified by section 402.207(3),
and there seems to be no way to revive it, at least by unilateral
contractual provision.
In appropriate cases buyer and seller may avoid problems resulting
from the exchange of forms containing conflicting terms by entering
into a specially "negotiated" contract or, in the case of a contemplated
series of transactions, by entering into an "overriding agreement" which
would govern the transactions regardless of the forms used.
Miscellaneous Acceptance Problems
Former technical rules as to acceptance, such as requiring that tele-
graphic offers be accepted by telegraphed acceptances, etc., are rejected
and a provision that the acceptance be "in any manner and by any me-
dium reasonable under the circumstances" is substituted.23
Under basic contract law an offer operates to create a power of
acceptance in the offeree and in some cases of laconic offers (such as
19297 F. 2d 497 (lst Cir. 1962).
20 See, for example, 1 HAWXLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UCC 16-17;
Note, 30 U. Ci. L. REv. 540 (1963); Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 132 (1962).21 WIS. STAT. §402.207(2) (a).
22 WIs. STAT. §402.207(1).
23 WIS. STAT. §402.206 (1).
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"send 1,000 widgets Tuesday") there may be doubt as to whether ac-
ceptance is to be made through a promise or by the act of shipment of
the goods. Section 402.206(1) (a) adopts the principle (at noted supra)
that, "[u]nless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language
or circumstances . .. [a]n offer to make a contract shall be construed
as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in
the circumstances; . . ." Section 402.206(1) (b), pursuing this general
rule (as to facts such as those of the "widget" case, supra), provides that
"[a]n order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current ship-
ment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt
promise to ship or by.... prompt or current shipment...."
A technical problem in simple contract law is also met by the latter
portion of section 402.206(1) (b) which provides in effect that accept-
ance may be deemed to have been made by the shipment of non-conform-
ing goods but that such a shipment of non-conforming goods does not
constitute an acceptance if the seller reasonably notifies the buyer that
the shipment is offered only as an accommodation. This provision means
that a seller may not rely upon the conclusion of simple contract law
that a shipment of non-conforming goods is not an acceptance and,
therefore, cannot constitute a breach. Under the Code, such a shipment
may be deemed to be both an acceptance and a breach, but the Code
permits the seller to avoid this result by seasonable notification to the
buyer that the goods in effect constitute a counter-offer. Hence, in ap-
propriate circumstances sellers should be alert to the importance of
making seasonable notification.
Under simple contract law in most situations the beginning of per-
formance in response to an offer bars the offeror's power of revoca-
tion. - On the other hand, if the contract is unilateral, since acceptance
is not made until the offeree's performance is complete, the offeree is
free to continue or stop performance as the market dictates.
This disparity of rights between offeror and offeree is partially
rectified by section 402.206(2), which provides that "[w]here the be-
ginning of a requested performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance
an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within a reasonable time
may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance." This language
would presumably not be of help to an offeror in cases where the offer
is clearly one to enter into a unilateral contract since then completion
of performance would be unambiguously indicated as the accepting
event; hence the beginning of performance would not be a reasonable
mode of acceptance; and, therefore, the language would be inapplicable.
In the event of an ambiguous offer, however, where the beginning of
a requested performance may be a reasonable mode of acceptance of
an offer to enter into a contract, the section would require the offeree
24 RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTs 45 (1932).
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to notify the offeror that he had accepted the offer and started per-
formance or risk the offeror's deeming the offeree's silence a rejection
with consequent freedom to commence dealing elsewhere. This situ-
ation might most frequently present itself where special manufacturing
is involved.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Scope and Effect of the Statute of Frauds
The Statute of Frauds set forth in section 402.201 applies only to
sales of "goods." "Goods" may include under appropriate circumstances
such forms of property severable from realty as timber, minerals and
growing crops, but it does not extend to "choses in action" and in this
respect differs from the Statute of Frauds in the Uniform Sales Act.
However, there are Statutes of Fraud in the other chapters of the Code
which apply to various types of intangible personal property.
23
The monetary limit for application of the Statute of Frauds has been
adjusted upward from the former amount of $50 to $500. Although
the monetary limit under the Code is stated in terms of the "price" of
the goods rather than of their "value," as under the Uniform Sales
Act, the meaning of these terms is probably the same for this purpose.
In conformity with the Uniform Sales Act, section 402.201(1)
provides that contracts for the sale of goods which violate the Statute
of Frauds are "unenforceable" (rather than "void"). Consistent with
this characterization, the Statute cannot be invoked by third persons not
parties to the contract, and a buyer coming into possession of goods
sold under an oral contract is not a trespasser. On the other hand Wis-
consin case law holding that the Statute is not required to be affirma-
tively pleaded (and for this purpose characterizing it as rendering
oral contracts "void") is presumably not overruled. 26
Satisfying the Statute of Frauds
The Code overrules cases holding memoranda under the Statute of
Frauds to be insufficient because of the omission or incorrect statement
of a term of the contract. Thus, section 402.201 (1) provides that "[a]
writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term
agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this subsection
beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing. '2 Reasonable proof
of the existence of the contract is assured by language in section
402.201(1) providing that the memorandum must take the form of
25 See particularly Wis. STAT. §401.206.
26 Cf. Holtan v. Bjornson, 260 Wis. 514, 51 N.W. 2d 719 (1952) ; Padgham v.
Wilson Music Co., 3 Wis. 2d 363, 88 N.W. 2d 679 (1958) ; Draper v. Wilson,
143 Wis. 510, 128 N.W. 66 (1910).
27 This provision is consistent with, and almost follows a fortiori from, the
principles embodied in the other sections of the mode which do not render
the contract unenforceable because certain material terms are unspecified,
such as Wis. STAT. §402.305 relating to open price terms, Wis. STAT. §402.306
relating to output or requirements agreements and Wis. STAT. §402.311 re-
lating to contracts leaving open the particulars of performance.
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".. . some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been
made between the parties and signed by the party against whom en-
forcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker." Given the
quality term of the contract, it is deemed more equitable to construct
the omitted terms (even though perhaps imperfectly) than to render
the entire transaction unenforceable.
A novel and useful approach by the Code is found in its handling
of the "letter of confirmation." Under section 402.201(2), "[b]etween
merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the
contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party re-
ceiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements
of sub. (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to its
contents is given within 10 days after it is received." Thus, unless the
recipient of a letter of confirmation objects to it within 10 days, neither
he nor the sender can invoke the Statute of Frauds. Because of this
provision buyers and sellers are well advised to write letters confirming
their telephonic contracts. Equally important, buyers and sellers should
be alert to object to written confirmations of agreements which they
did not in fact make.
Section 402.201(3(c) provides that partial performance of an oral
contract satisfies the Statute of Frauds only "[w]ith respect to goods
for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been
received and accepted. . . ." Thus receipt and acceptance as to a smaller
quantity of merchandise will not bar the defense of the Statute as to a
larger quantity. Under the prior law on the other hand, receipt and
acceptance, for example, of one automobile would open the door to a
claimed oral contract for many automobiles.
An area of doubt under section 402.201 (3) (c) exists with respect
to the situation where there has been part payment for good as dis-
tinguished from partial acceptance and receipt of them. Thus, if there
has been an oral agreement to sell several units but only a fraction
of the price of one unit has been paid, it may be argued alternatively
that (1) payment has been made and accepted "with respect to" one
unit, or (2) payment has been made and accepted "with respect to"
no units at all. The better view, although it seems to depart from the
plain language of the statutes, is that under these circumstances the sale
of one unit is removed from the Statute of Frauds. It also appears
reasonable to reject the possible third view that, absent other circum-
stances, the partial payment should be allocated to the several units
involved and that, therefore, the defense of the Statute of Frauds is
unavailable as to all these units.
Section 402.201 (3) (b) provides that the Statute of Frauds is satis-
fied "[i]f the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his
pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was
[Vol. 49
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made, but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond
the quantity of goods admitted;. . ." This provision recognizes one line
of cases to the effect that judicial admissions represent a sui generis
method of satisfaction distinct from the method of incorporation in a
memorandum. It is an interesting question of policy whether a party
may be compelled over proper evidentiary objection to admit the ex-
istence of an oral contract. It is also not clear how liberally the pro-
vision is to be construed so as to include such subsidiary proceedings
as pre-trial discovery proceedings.
Section 402.201(3) (a) continues the special manufacturing ex-
ception to the Statute of Frauds but with a somewhat modified rationale.
Under the Code special manufacturing is protected because special
manufacturers are presumed to be in a peculiarly vulnerable position
with respect to disposition of the goods in case of repudiation of the
contract; on the other hand, under prior law special manufacturing was
excepted because, in some aspects at least, it was deemed tantamount
to an agreement for "work and labor" rather than for the sale of goods.
Hence, consistent with the revised rationale, under the Code a seller
need not be himself the special manufacturer, but need only make
commitments for procurement of specially manufactured goods. Con-
sistent with the same approach, the seller, to have the benefit of the
special manufacturing exception, must have changed his position in
reliance on the alleged oral contract.
CONTRACT FORMATION PROBLEMS IN AUCTION SALES
Auctions With or Withou Reserve
Following the approach of the Uniform Sales Act the simple con-
tract law applicable to auction sales has been amplified and clarified by
the special provisions of section 402.328.
Subsection (3) of section 402.328 recognizes that an auction sale
is "with reserve" unless specifically stated to be "without reserve." The
subsection recognizes the general American rule that a sale may be
made one "with reserve" by appropriate announcement before the goods
are put up (even though the sale was previously advertised as being
"without reserve.") It is, of course, conceivable that a prior advertise-
ment of a sale "without reserve" could constitute a firm offer under
section 402.205 if it were properly framed.
In an auction "with reserve" the auctioneer may reject all the bids
and withdraw the goods without making a sale until he announces com-
pletion of the sale.
28
Even in an auction sale "with reserve" there may be no bidding
by the seller or on the seller's behalf unless notice has been given that
liberty for such bidding is reserved.2 9 In addition, the language of the
2 8 
WIs. STAT. §402.328(3).
2 9 WIS. STAT. §402.328(4).
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Code does not require the auctioneer, if he sells at all, to sell to the
highest bidder, but since this is the usage of the trade,30 notice must
be given of any deviation from normal procedure.
If an auction is announced as "without reserve," although the bidder
may retract his bid at any time before it is accepted, the auctioneer can-
not withdraw an article or lot unless no bid is made within a reasonable
time after bids on that article or lot are called for, and the auctioneer
must, therefore, if bids are made, sell to the highest bidder. 3'
Section 402.328(2) provides that a sale by auction is complete when
the auctioneer so announces by the fall of the hammer or in other cus-
tomary manner. Problems may arise as to the legal effect to be given
to a bid made while the hammer is falling. Section 402.328(2) gives the
auctioneer discretion either to honor the bid received before the fall of
the hammer or to reopen the bidding.
Fraudulently Conducted Auctions
Secret bidding at auctions by the seller or one acting on his behalf
(known as "puffing") is considered fraudulent because it creates a
misleading impression as to competition for the goods and also may
deprive the highest bona fide bidder of his right to the goods. Under
section 402.328(4) the buyer, in the event of puffing, may at his option
avoid the sale or take the goods at the price of the last good faith bid
prior to completion of the sale. The interpretation of the words "last
good faith bid" is sometimes difficult, but, in the case of a series of
bids made by the same buyer, interspersed by puffer's bids, it would
probably mean the last good faith bid made by the buyer prior to the
bids made on the seller's behalf. On the other hand, if a buyer bids,
for example, $100 and is overbid by a puffer's offer of $110 and an
innocent third party thereupon bids $120, all of which bids are followed
by subsequent bids by the original buyer and the puffer, the result
ought seemingly to be that the buyer must pay $120 (the third party's
bid) for the goods. This result tends to minimize the seller's fraudulent
profit without unjustly depriving the third party of the goods.3 2
The converse of "puffing" by the seller is "chill bidding" wherein
two or more buyers agreed not to bid against one another. Although
section 402.328(4) does not deal explicitly with this problem, common-
law remedies for fraud, which are not affected by the Code, would be
available.
Under section 402.328(4) anti-puffing provisions do not apply to
any bid at a forced sale. In construing this provision there is some
ambiguity as to whether the "seller" (and hence the "puffer") is deemed
to be a person whose goods are foreclosed against, or a person fore-
30 Wis. STAT. §401.205.
31 WIS. STAT. §402.328(3).32See I HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UCC 40.
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closing against the goods of another. Relief from anti-puffing pro-
visions may seem justified in the case of a debtor to prevent a depressed
price from prevailing at the forced sale of his property. Such relief,
however, would seem less justified as to a creditor who by puffing would
be allowed to profit at the expense of third parties.
